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Abstract
Secret sharing schemes allow a secret to be shared among a group of participants so that only
quali$ed subsets of participants can recover the secret. A visual cryptography scheme (VCS) is
a special kind of secret sharing scheme in which the secret to share consists of an image and
the shares consist of xeroxed transparencies which are stacked to recover the shared image.
In this paper, we analyze the relationship between secret sharing schemes and VCSs, focusing
our attention on the amount of randomness required to generate the shares. We prove that secret
sharing schemes for a set of secrets of size two (BSSs) and VCSs are “equivalent” with respect
to the randomness. Indeed, we show how to transform a BSS for a given access structure into
a VCS for the same access structure while preserving the randomness of the original scheme.
We provide both upper and lower bounds on the randomness of BSSs.
All VCSs presented in this paper allow a perfect reconstruction of black pixels.
c© 2003 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
A secret sharing scheme allows a secret to be shared among a set P of n participants
so that only certain quali$ed subsets of participants can recover the secret, whereas
forbidden subsets of participants have no information on the secret. To this aim, the
 Preliminary version of some results presented in this paper already appeared in extended conference
abstracts [16,18,19]. Most of them appeared without a proof.
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secret is encoded into n pieces called shares each of which is given to a distinct
participant. A qualiCed subset of participants can recover the secret by pooling together
their shares, whereas forbidden subsets of participants cannot gain any information on
the secret from their shares. The speciCcation of all qualiCed and forbidden subsets of
participants constitutes an access structure.
Secret sharing schemes are especially useful in situations which require that several
people cooperate in order to start an important action such as opening a bank vault or
a safety deposit box, or launching a missile.
Shamir [28] and Blakley [6] have been the Crst to introduce secret sharing schemes.
In particular, they considered (k; n)-threshold schemes, that is schemes where only
subsets of P of size larger than or equal to a Cxed integer k can reconstruct the secret.
Ito et al. [24] showed how to realize a secret sharing scheme for any access structure.
Later, Benaloh and Leichter [5] proposed a simpler and more eEcient way to realize
secret sharing schemes. Other general techniques handling arbitrary access structures
have been described by Martin [25] and by Simmons et al. [29].
An important issue in the implementation of secret sharing schemes is the amount
of randomness required for generating the shares. Blundo et al. [13] have been the Crst
to analyze the randomness of secret sharing schemes. Random bits are a natural com-
putational resource which must be taken into account when designing cryptographic
algorithms. Considerable eFort has been devoted to reduce the number of bits used
by probabilistic algorithms (see for example [23]) and to analyze the amount of ran-
domness required in order to achieve a given performance. Motivated by the fact that
“truly” random bits are hard to generate, it has also been investigated the possibility of
using imperfect source of randomness in randomized algorithms [33]. In spite of the
considerable eFort devoted in analyzing the incidence of randomness in several areas
of computer science, very few results have been obtained to quantify the amount of
random bits required to solve classes of problems.
A special kind of secret sharing schemes are visual cryptography schemes. A vi-
sual cryptography scheme (VCS) is a secret sharing scheme where the secret to share
consists of an image. A VCS for a set P of n participants encodes a secret im-
age into n shadow images which constitute the shares given to the n participants.
Each share is xeroxed onto a transparency. If X ⊆P is qualiCed then the partici-
pants in X can visually recover the secret image by stacking their transparencies
without any cryptography knowledge and without performing any cryptographic
computation.
In this paper, we only consider VCSs for black and white images. Visual cryptogra-
phy schemes for black and white images have been deCned by Naor and Shamir [26]
where they analyzed (k; n)-threshold visual cryptography schemes. Ateniese et al. [1,2]
extended the model by Naor and Shamir to general access structures.
In this paper, we analyze the relationship between general secret sharing schemes
and visual cryptography schemes with respect to the randomness required to generate
the shares. The results presented in the paper are summarized below.
Lower bounds: Since in a VCS the secret image is encoded pixel by pixel, then
a VCS for black and white images is a special case of secret sharing scheme with
a set of secrets of size two. We refer to such a secret sharing scheme with the term
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of binary secret sharing scheme (BSS). It follows that lower bounds on the randomness
of BSSs apply also to VCSs. We will present a technique to derive lower bounds on
the randomness of BSSs for general access structures as well as on the number of
diFerent shares assigned to each participant. In particular, we provide a lower bound
on the randomness of (k; n)-threshold BSSs.
Equivalence of BSSs and VCSs with respect to the randomness: We shade a
new light on the study of secret sharing schemes by proving that lower bounds on
the randomness of VCSs apply also to BSSs, thus proving that BSSs and VCSs
are “equivalent” with respect to the randomness. In other words, we prove that the
minimum number of random bits needed to secretly share a pixel is the same as that
needed to share any secret chosen in a set of size two. Indeed, given a BSS  for an
access structure , we show how to construct a VCS for  with the same randomness
as .
VCSs constructions: Another important consequence of our randomness preserving
transformation is that upper bounds on the randomness of secret sharing schemes apply
also to VCSs. Indeed, our randomness preserving transformation allows to construct
VCSs by exploiting the well-known construction techniques for secret sharing schemes.
We provide VCS constructions for general access structures based on the decompo-
sition technique, the cumulative arrays, and the Brickell scheme. By exploiting the
Brickell scheme, we have obtained randomness optimal VCSs for all access structures
whose basis can be represented by a complete multipartite graph. This result implies a
randomness optimal construction for (2; n)-threshold VCSs. Our randomness preserving
transformation will also be applied to construct a randomness optimal (k; k)-threshold
VCS and to derive a new upper bound on the randomness of (k; n)-threshold VCSs.
This upper bound dramatically improves on all previously known upper bounds and is
very close to our lower bound.
All VCSs obtained by applying our randomness preserving transformation allow a
perfect reconstruction of black pixels.
In [17] we have used our randomness preserving transformation to obtain randomness
optimal VCSs for all strong access structures on at most four participants.
Outline of the paper: In Section 2, we describe the models of secret sharing schemes
and visual cryptography schemes used throughout the paper.
Section 3 deals with the problem of deriving lower bounds on the randomness of
BSSs. We provide a technique to derive lower bounds on the randomness of BSSs
for general access structures and present a lower bound on the randomness of (k; n)-
threshold BSSs.
In Section 4, we show how to transform a BSS for a given access structure  into
a VCS for the same access structure while preserving the randomness of the original
BSS.
The construction for (k; n)-threshold VCSs as well as the randomness optimal con-
struction for (k; k)-threshold VCSs are presented in Section 5.
In Section 6, we show how to apply to VCSs some very well known construc-
tions for secret sharing schemes and provide a randomness optimal VCS construction
for the access structures whose basis can be represented by a complete multipartite
graph.
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2. The model
Let P= {1; : : : ; n} be a set of elements called participants, and let 2P denote the
set of all subsets of P. Let Qual⊆ 2P and Forb⊆ 2P, where Qual ∩Forb= ∅. We
refer to members of Qual as quali$ed sets and to members of Forb as forbidden sets.
The pair =(Qual; Forb) is called the access structure of the scheme.
A participant P ∈P is an essential participant if there exists a set X ⊆P such that
X ∪{P}∈Qual but X ∈Qual. A non-essential participant does not need to participate
“actively” in the reconstruction of the secret, since the information she has is not needed
by any set in P in order to recover the shared image. In any secret sharing scheme
having non-essential participants, these participants do not require any information in
their shares. For that reason, in the remainder of the paper, we will assume that non-
essential participants receive “empty” shares, thus focusing only on the shares assigned
to essential participants.
Let 0 consist of all the minimal qualiCed sets:
0 = {A ∈ Qual : A′ ∈ Qual for all A′ ⊂ A}:
In the case where Qual is monotone increasing and Qual ∪Forb=2P, the access
structure is said to be strong and 0 is termed a basis. In a strong access structure,
Qual = {C ⊆ P : B ⊆ C for some B ∈ 0}
and we say that Qual is the closure of 0.
In the following we formally deCne secret sharing schemes for a strong access struc-
ture (Qual; Forb). Indeed, in traditional secret sharing schemes the access structures
are always assumed to be strong.
A secret sharing scheme  with set of secrets S = {s0; : : : ; sh−1} on a set P of
participants for the strong access structure (Qual; Forb) is a method to secretly share
a secret chosen in S among the members of P in such a way that only subsets of
participants which are in Qual can recover the secret. The secret sharing scheme 
consists of h collections of distribution functions C0; : : : ;Ch−1. A distribution function
f∈Cb, b=0; : : : ; h − 1, is a function which associates to each participant P ∈P a
share. When the secret to share is sb, b=0; : : : ; h − 1, the dealer randomly chooses a
distribution function f∈Cb and assigns to each participant P ∈P the share f(P).
Denition 2.1. Let (Qual; Forb) be a strong access structure on a set P of participants.
The collections of distribution functions C0; : : : ;Ch−1 realize a secret sharing scheme
for the access structure (Qual; Forb) with set of secrets of size h if the following
conditions hold:
1. Any subset X ⊆P of participants qualiCed to recover the secret can compute the
secret.
Formally, if X ∈Qual, then it results {(i; f(i))}i∈X = {(i; g(i))}i∈X , for all f∈Ci
and g∈Cj with i; j∈{0; : : : ; h− 1} and i = j.
2. Any subset X ⊆P of participants non-qualiCed to recover the secret has no
information on the secret value.
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Formally, if X = {i1; : : : ; ia}∈Forb, then for any possible choice shi1 ; : : : ; shia of
the shares given to participants i1; : : : ; ia, it results
|{f ∈ Ci : (f(i1); : : : ; f(ia)) = (shi1 ; : : : ; shia)}|
|Ci|
=
|{f ∈ Cj : (f(i1); : : : ; f(ia)) = (shi1 ; : : : ; shia)}|
|Cj|
for any i; j∈{0; : : : ; h− 1}.
The Crst property is related to the reconstruction of the secret. It states that for any
pair of distinct secrets si and sj, the group of shares assigned to a qualiCed group of
participants, when si is the encoded secret, is always diFerent from that assigned to
the same group of participants when the encoded secret is sj.
The second property is called security, since it implies that, even by inspecting all
their shares, a forbidden set of participants cannot gain any information on the shared
secret.
Notice that in the previous deCnition Cb, b=0; : : : ; h−1, is a multiset of distribution
functions, therefore we allow a function to appear more than once in Cb, b=0; : : : ; h−1.
Moreover, the sizes of the collections C0; : : : ;Ch−1 do not need to be the same.
For b=1; : : : ; h− 1, the function collection Cb= {fb1 ; : : : ; fbcb} can be represented by
an n× cb table Tb such that Tb[i; j] =fbj (i), for any i=1; : : : ; n, and j=1; : : : ; cb. A share
will be symbolically represented by a literal indexed with the associated participant. For
a given participant i∈{1; : : : ; n}, distinct literals indexed with i denote distinct share
values. Notice that Property 1 of DeCnition 2.1 implies that if we restrict T0; : : : ; Th−1
to the rows corresponding to a set X ∈Qual, we obtain h tables having no common
column. Moreover, Property 2 of DeCnition 2.1 implies that if we restrict T0; : : : ; Th−1
to the rows corresponding to a set X ∈Forb, we obtain h tables whose multisets of
columns are indistinguishable, in the sense that they contain the same columns with
the same relative frequencies.
2.1. Dealer’s randomness in secret sharing schemes
The randomness of a secret sharing scheme represents the number of random bits
used by the dealer to share a secret among the participants. Let  be a secret sharing
scheme for a set of h secrets s0; : : : ; sh−1 realized by the collections C0; : : : ;Ch−1. For
i=0; : : : ; h−1, let pi denote the probability that the shared secret is si. The randomness
of  with respect to p=(p0; : : : ; ph−1) has been deCned by Blundo et al. [13] as
R(C0 ;:::;Ch−1);p =
h−1∑
i=0
pi log |Ci|: (1)
Given an access structure =(Qual; Forb) we are interested in estimating the min-
imum number of random bits required by the dealer of a secret sharing scheme for .
For the purpose of the lower bound analysis we need to limit from below the number
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of random bits needed to share any of the secrets. In other words, we have to show
that in any secret sharing scheme for  the dealer uses at least a certain amount of
random bits whichever is the secret to share. In accordance with [13], we deCne the
minimum randomness of the secret sharing schemes for the access structure  as
RMIN = inf
A;I
R(C0 ;:::;Ch−1);p;
where A denotes the set of all h-tuples of collections C0; : : : ;Ch−1 realizing a secret
sharing scheme for  with set of secrets {s0; : : : ; sh−1}, and I is the set of all probability
vectors of length h with non-zero entries. Indeed, we assume that the secret have
non-zero probability of being any of s0; : : : ; sh−1. In [13] the above deCnition has been
proved to be equivalent to the following:
RMIN = min
A
log(min{|C0|; : : : ; |Ch−1|}): (2)
The above deCnition of randomness will be used in the lower bound analysis of Sec-
tion 3. On the other hand, in the upper bound analysis the goal is to prove that there
exists a secret sharing scheme which requires no more than a certain amount of random
bits for any of the secrets. In other words, we want to derive an upper bound on the
number of random bits needed to share a secret provided that the secret to be shared
is chosen by an adversary. For the purpose of the upper bound analysis we deCne the
maximum randomness of the secret sharing schemes for the access structure  as
RMAX = inf
A
sup
I
R(C0 ;:::;Ch−1);p;
where A and I are deCned as above. By an argument similar to that used in [13] it
is possible to prove that the above deCnition is equivalent to the following:
RMAX = min
A
log(max{|C0|; : : : ; |Ch−1|}): (3)
We want to point out that all secret sharing schemes presented in this paper consist of
equally sized function collections. For these schemes the deCnition of randomness (1)
is independent from the probability distribution p. Therefore, when dealing with our
constructions we will refer to expression (1) simply as randomness of the scheme with-
out considering the probability distribution on the secrets. In particular, for a scheme
realized by h function collections C0; : : : ;Ch−1 of size c the randomness of the scheme
is given by
R(C0 ;:::;Ch−1) = log c; where c = |C0|; : : : ; |Ch−1|: (4)
Obviously for all schemes realized by equally sized function collections C0; : : : ;Ch−1
one has that
R(C0 ;:::;Ch−1) ¿ RMAX ¿R
MIN
 : (5)
When in the paper we say that a scheme is randomness optimal we mean that it
satisCes inequalities (5) with equality.
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2.2. Visual cryptography schemes
We assume that the image to be encoded consists of a collection of black and white
pixels. The image is encoded pixel by pixel. Therefore, the dealer has to share each
single pixel among the participants. For each participant the shares associated with
the pixels of the secret image are xeroxed onto a transparency. The participants of a
qualiCed set can visually recover the secret image by stacking their transparencies.
Each share is a collection of m black and white subpixels. The shares assigned
to the n participants can be described by an n×m boolean matrix M = [mij] where
mij =1 iF the jth subpixel in the ith transparency is black. Therefore, the grey level of
the combined share, obtained by stacking the transparencies i1; : : : ; is, is proportional to
the Hamming weight w(V ) of the m-entry vector V =OR(Ri1 ; : : : ; Ris), where Ri1 ; : : : ; Ris
are the rows of M associated with the stacked transparencies. This grey level is inter-
preted by the visual system of the users as black or as white according to some rule
of contrast.
Denition 2.2. Let (Qual; Forb) be an access structure on a set of n participants. Two
collections (multisets) of n×m boolean matrices Cˆ0 and Cˆ1 constitute a visual cryp-
tography scheme for the access structure (Qual; Forb) ((Qual; Forb)-VCS) if there
exist a value  and a collection {(X; tX )}X∈Qual satisfying:
1. Any (quali$ed) set X = {i1; i2; : : : ; ip}∈Qual can recover the shared image by
stacking their transparencies.
Formally, for any M ∈ Cˆ0, the “or” V of rows i1; i2; : : : ; ip satisCes w(V )6tX−m;
whereas, for any M ∈ Cˆ1 it results that w(V )¿tX .
2. Any ( forbidden) set X = {i1; i2; : : : ; ip}∈Forb has no information on the shared
image.
Formally, the two collections of p×m matrices obtained by restricting each n×m
matrix in Cˆb, with b∈{0; 1}, to rows i1; i2; : : : ; ip are indistinguishable in the sense
that they contain the same matrices with the same relative frequencies.
Each pixel of the original image will be encoded into n pixels, each of which consists
of m subpixels. To share a white (black, resp.) pixel, the dealer randomly chooses one
of the matrices in Cˆ0 (Cˆ1, resp.) and distributes row i to participant i.
The Crst property of DeCnition 2.2 is related to the contrast of the image. It states
that when a qualiCed set of users stack their transparencies they can correctly recover
the shared image. Observe that this property implies Property 1 of DeCnition 2.1. The
value  is called relative di;erence, the number m is referred to as the contrast of the
image, the set {(X; tX )}X∈Qual is called the set of thresholds, and tX is the threshold
associated to X ∈Qual. Notice that the contrast is at least one, that is, ¿1=m. The
second property, similarly to Property 2 of DeCnition 2.2, is related to the security of
the scheme.
The model of visual cryptography we consider is the same as that described by
Ateniese et al. [1,2]. This model is a generalization of the one proposed by Naor and
Shamir [26], since with each set X ∈Qual we associate a (possibly) diFerent threshold
tX . Further, the access structure is not required to be strong in our model.
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Notice that if a set of participants X is a superset of a qualiCed set X ′, then they can
recover the shared image by considering only the shares of the set X ′. This does not
in itself rule out the possibility that stacking all the transparencies of the participants
in X does not reveal any information about the shared image.
We are interested in estimating lower and upper bounds on the number of random
bits per pixel required to share a secret image. Let p0 (p1, resp.) denote the probability
that the shared secret pixel is white (black, resp.). In accordance with deCnition (1)
we deCne the randomness of a VCS realized by the matrix collections Cˆ0 and Cˆ1 with
respect to p=(p0; p1) as
R(Cˆ0 ;Cˆ1);p = p0 log |Cˆ0|+ p1 log |Cˆ1|: (6)
Let  be an access structure. Following deCnitions (2) and (3), we deCne the minimum
randomness RMIN of the visual cryptography schemes for  as
RMIN = min
B
log(min{|Cˆ0|; |Cˆ1|})
and the maximum randomness RMAX of the visual cryptography schemes for  as
RMAX = min
B
log(max{|Cˆ0|; |Cˆ1|});
where B denotes the set of all pairs of collections Cˆ0 and Cˆ1 realizing a VCS for
. We remark that all VCSs presented in this paper consist of equally sized matrix
collections for which randomness (6) is independent from the probability distribution
on the secrets and is therefore denoted with R(Cˆ0 ;Cˆ1). We will say that such a VCS is
randomness optimal if it is
R(Cˆ0 ;Cˆ1) = RMAX = R
MIN
 :
2.3. Basic notations
In the remainder of the paper we will often make use of the following notations:
• Let M be an n-row matrix and let X ⊆{1; : : : ; n}. M [X ] denotes the matrix obtained
by restricting M to the rows with indices in X . The rows appear in M [X ] in the
same order they appear in M .
• Let C= {M1; : : : ; Mc} be a collection of n-row matrices and let X ⊆{1; : : : ; n}. We
denote with C[X ] the matrix collection {M1[X ]; : : : ; Mc[X ]}.
• w(M [X ]) denotes the Hamming weight of the “or” of all rows of M with indices
in X .
• Let T be a table with n rows and c columns, and let i∈{1; : : : ; n} and j∈{1; : : : ; c}.
We denote with T [i; j] the entry (i; j) of T . Moreover, for any set of row indices
X ⊆{1; : : : ; n} we denote with T [X ] the table obtained by restricting T to the rows
with indices in X , and with T [X; j] the jth column of T [X ].
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3. Lower bounds on the randomness of BSSs
The following theorem provides a technique to derive lower bounds on the minimum
randomness of BSSs for general access structures.
Theorem 3.1. Let C0 and C1 realize a BSS for the strong access structure (Qual;
Forb) on a set of participants P. Let G be a subset of Forb with the property
that for any pair of distinct sets A; B∈G, there exists a set C ∈Qual such that
C =A∪B. For any i∈P, let Gi = {A∈G : i∈A} and let di = |{x : T0[i; j] = x for
some j∈{1; : : : ; c0}}|¿2. Then, C0 and C1 have both size larger than or equal to
max{|G|;maxi∈P {di · |Gi|}}.
Proof. Let c0 and c1 denote the size of C0 and C1, respectively, and let j0 ∈{1; : : : ; c0}.
Property 1 of DeCnition 2.1 implies T0[Y; j0] =T1[Y; j1], for any Y ∈Qual and any
j1 ∈{1; : : : ; c1}. Let A and B be two distinct members of G. Since there exists a set
C ∈Qual such that C =A∪B, then it must be
T0[A∪B; j0] =T1[A∪B; j1] for any j1 ∈ {1; : : : ; c1}: (7)
Since it is A; B∈Forb then Property 2 of DeCnition 2.1 implies that
T0[A; j0] = T1[A; ja] and T0[B; j0]=T1[B; jb];
for some column indices ja; jb ∈ {1; : : : ; c1}: (8)
From (7) it follows that
T0[A ∪ B; j0] = T1[A ∪ B; ja] and T0[A ∪ B; j0] = T1[A ∪ B; jb]: (9)
Consequently, it should be ja = jb, otherwise from (8) one would get T0[A∪B; j0]=
T1[A∪B; ja] =T1[A∪B; jb], thus contradicting inequalities (9). Hence, each member of
G is associated to a distinct column of T1, that is, c1¿|G|. Analogously, we can show
that c0¿|G|.
Let i∈P. We assume |Gi|¿0 since the theorem trivially holds for a participant
i such that |Gi|=0. Since |Gi|¿0, then i belongs to at least a forbidden set and
consequently by Property 2 of DeCnition 2.1 one has that the set of distinct shares
assigned to participant i by the distribution functions of C0 is the same as that assigned
by the distribution functions of C1. Let {sh1i ; : : : ; shdii } denote such set of di distinct
values assigned to participant i as share. Let T0; shui (T1; shui , resp.) denote the subsets of
the columns of T0 (T1, resp.) which have the ith entry equal to shui , for u=1; : : : ; di, and
let j0 ∈T0; shui , for some u∈{1; : : : ; di}. By the same argument as that used above, it is
possible to prove that for any X ∈Gi there exists a distinct column jx of T1; shui such that
T0[X; j0]=T1[X; jx]. As a consequence, it results |T1; shui |¿|Gi|. For any u; v∈{1; : : : ; di},
with u = v, the collections T1; shui and T1; shvi are disjoint, and consequently, it results|c1|¿di · |Gi|. Analogously, we can show that |c0|¿di · |Gi|.
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As an application of the above theorem, we derive a lower bound on the size of the
function collections realizing a BSS for a (k; n)-threshold structure. A (k; n)-threshold
structure (Qual; Forb) on a set P of n participants is an access structure in which
0 = {B ⊆ P : |B| = k} and Forb = {B ⊆ P : |B|¡ k}:
A BSS for a (k; n)-threshold access structure is called (k; n)-threshold BSS.
Let G denote the family of all subsets of P of size k−1. It is G⊆Forb. Moreover,
for any A; B∈G, with A =B, one has that A∪B contains at least a subset of P of
size k. Hence, G satisCes the hypothesis of Theorem 3.1. Let Gi = {A∈G : i∈A},
for i=1; : : : ; n. It is |Gi|=( n−1k−2 ). For i=1; : : : ; n; let di be deCned as in Theorem 3.1.
Then, Theorem 3.1 implies that C0 and C1 have both size larger than or equal to both( n
k−1
)
and (maxi∈{1; :::; n}{di})
( n−1
k−2
)
¿2
( n−1
k−2
)
.
Theorem 2.13 of [13] implies that the minimum randomness of the (k; n)-threshold
BSSs is at least k − 1. Hence, one has the following lower bound on the minimum
randomness of the (k; n)-threshold BSSs:
max
{
1 + log
(
n− 1
k − 2
)
; log
(
n
k − 1
)
; k − 1
}
: (10)
We can improve on lower bound (10) by deriving a lower bound on the number
of values which are assigned as share to each participant. In order to prove this lower
bound, we Crst derive a lower bound on the number of values assigned as share to
each participant by a (2; n)-threshold BSS. Such lower bound will also be used to
derive a lower bound on the number of distinct shares assigned to a participant by
a BSS for a general access structure. This result can be used in conjunction with
Theorem 3.1 to derive lower bounds on the minimum randomness of VCSs for general
access structures.
3.1. Lower bounds on the number of distinct shares in a (2; n)-threshold BSS
Let C0 = {f01 ; : : : ; f0c0} and C1 = {f11 ; : : : ; f1c1} be two function collections realizing
a (2; n)-threshold BSS, n¿2. Observe that lower bound (10) implies cb¿n, b∈{0; 1}.
Moreover, one has that the following theorem holds.
Theorem 3.2. Let C0 = {f01 ; : : : ; f0c0} and C1 = {f11 ; : : : ; f1c1}, with c0; c1¿n, be two
function collections realizing a (2; n)-threshold BSS. There exists at least an index
i∈{1; : : : ; n} such that participant i is given at least n distinct values as share. In
other words, there exists at least an index i∈{1; : : : ; n} such that at least n entries
in the ith row of Tb, b=0; 1, are pairwise distinct.
Proof. Let us assume for the moment that c0 = c1 = c. For i=1; : : : ; n, let di be the
number of distinct values assigned as share to participant i, and let sh1i ; : : : ; sh
di
i denote
these di distinct values. We associate with the (2; n)-threshold BSS two n× c matrices
M0 and M1 such that the entry (i; j) of Mb, for b∈{0; 1}, is u∈{1; : : : ; di} if and
only if Tb[i; j] = shui . Let s= maxi∈{1; :::; n}{di}. The matrices M0 and M1 associated
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with the (2; n)-threshold BSS have entries in {1; : : : ; s} and satisfy the following two
properties:
(1) For each i=1; : : : ; n and for each j=1; : : : ; s, the number of entries equal to j in
the ith row of M0 and the number of entries equal to j in the ith row of M1 are
both equal to the same value Nij¿0.
(2) For any pair of columns cj of M0 and c‘ of M1, there exists at most one index
i∈{1; : : : ; n} such that the ith entries of cj and c‘ coincide.
Observe that the following inequality holds:
c2¿
n∑
i=1
s∑
j=1
(Nij)
2: (11)
Indeed, the left-hand side of the above inequality counts the number of pairs of columns
(cj; c‘) with cj and c‘ being columns of M0 and M1, respectively, whereas the sum-
mation on the right-hand side only counts the number of those pairs (cj; c‘) for which
there exists an index i∈{1; : : : ; n} such that the ith entries of cj and c‘ are identical.
On the other hand, by Jensen’s inequality
s∑
j=1
1
s
(Nij)
2 ¿
(
s∑
j=1
Nij
s
)2
=
c2
s2
; i = 1; : : : ; n:
Then, summing up over all i=1; : : : ; n, we get
n∑
i=1
s∑
j=1
(Nij)
2 =
n∑
i=1
s
s∑
j=1
1
s
(Nij)
2 ¿
n
s
c2: (12)
Inequalities (11) and (12) imply c2¿(n=s)c2. As a consequence, two matrices M0 and
M1 with entries in {1; : : : ; s} and fulClling properties 1 and 2 can be constructed only
if s¿n.
The above result can be easily extended to (2; n)-threshold BSSs realized by function
collections of diFerent sizes. Indeed, let C0 and C1 be two function collections realizing
a (2; n)-threshold BSS and suppose that |C0|= c0 and |C1|= c1 = c0.
Now, we show how to obtain a (2; n)-threshold BSS realized by equally sized func-
tion collections. We will illustrate the technique for a generic k, with 26k6n. Let 
be a (k; n)-threshold BSS realized by two function collections Q0 and Q1 of size q0
and q1, respectively. Let T0 and T1 be the tables associated to Q0 and Q1, respectively.
We construct the collections Q′0 and Q
′
1 of a new (k; n)-threshold BSS 
′ by taking q1
copies of each function in Q0 and q0 copies of each function in Q1, respectively. Hence
we obtain |Q′0|= |Q′1|= q= q0q1. Let T ′0 and T ′1 be the two tables associated to Q′0 and
Q′1. We have to show that Properties 1 and 2, of DeCnition 2.1 are satisCed. Clearly,
Property 1 of DeCnition 2.1 holds. Let X = {i1; : : : ; ik−1} be any subset of {1; : : : ; n}
of size k − 1 and let f∈Q0 ∪Q1. For b∈{0; 1}, let /bX and 0bX denote the number of
times that the column (f(i1); : : : ; f(ik−1)) appears in Tb[X ] and T ′b [X ], respectively.
From Property 2 of DeCnition 2.1, we have that /0X =q0 = /
1
X =q1.
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It results that 00X = /
0
X · q1 and 01X = /1X · q0. Therefore,
00X
q
=
/0X · q1
q0 · q1 =
/0X
q0
=
/1X
q1
=
/1X · q0
q1 · q0 =
01X
q
:
Thus, Property 2 of DeCnition 2.1 is satisCed.
Hence, we can use the above construction to obtain two equally sized collections
C′0 and C
′
1 realizing a (2; n)-threshold BSS. We have proved that there is at least a
participant who is assigned at least n distinct values by such a BSS. The number of
distinct shares assigned to each participant in this BSS is the same as in the (2; n)-
threshold BSS realized by C0 and C1. Consequently, the theorem holds also for the
(2; n)-threshold BSS realized by C0 and C1.
If a (2; n)-threshold BSS assigns to each participant at most n distinct values as
share, then the following theorem holds.
Theorem 3.3. Let C0 = {f01 ; : : : ; f0c0} and C1 = {f11 ; : : : ; f1c1}, with c0; c1¿n, be two
function collections realizing a (2; n)-threshold BSS. If no participant is assigned
more than n distinct values as share, then all participants are assigned exactly n
distinct values as share. Let us denote with sh1i ; : : : ; sh
n
i , the n distinct values assigned
to participant i, for i=1; : : : ; n. It is |{j :Tb[i; j] = shui }|= cbn , for b∈{0; 1} and for
any u=1; : : : ; n. Consequently, both c0 and c1 are multiples of n. Moreover, for
any pair of column indices j0 ∈{1; : : : ; c0} and j1 ∈{1; : : : ; c1}, there exists an index
i∈{1; : : : ; n} such that T0[i; j0]=T1[i; j1].
Proof. Let us assume for the moment that c0 = c1 = c.
Let M0 and M1 be deCned as in the proof of Theorem 3.2. Notice that if s= n,
then M0 and M1 exist only if equality holds in both (11) and (12) of the proof of
Theorem 3.2. Equality holds in (11) if and only if all pairs of columns (cj; c‘), with
cj and c‘ being columns of M0 and M1, respectively, coincide in exactly one entry.
Jensen’s inequality implies that equality holds in (12) if and only if Nij = c=s, for any
i=1; : : : ; n and j=1; : : : ; s.
The above result can be easily extended to (2; n)-threshold BSSs realized by two
function collections C0 and C1 with diFerent sizes. Let us assume c0 = c1. We can
obtain two equally sized function collections C′0 and C
′
1 realizing a (2; n)-threshold
BSS by taking c1 copies of each function in C0 and c0 copies of each function in
C1, respectively, as shown in the proof of Theorem 3.2. We have just proved that
the theorem holds for the equally sized collections C′0 and C
′
1. Let T0 and T1 be the
tables associated with C0 and C1, and let T ′0 and T
′
1 those associated to C
′
0 and C
′
1.
Property 2 of DeCnition 3.1 implies that any distinct share value occurs in T ′0[{i}]
(T ′1[{i}], resp.), i=1; : : : ; n, with c1 (c0, resp.) times the multiplicity with which it
occurs in T0[{i}] (T1[{i}], resp.). Hence, the collections C0 and C1 also verify the
statement of the theorem.
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3.2. A better lower bound on the randomness of (k; n)-threshold BSSs
We Crst derive a lower bound on the number of distinct values which are assigned
by a (k; n)-threshold BSS to each participant. Beimel and Chor [4] claim an analogous
result by Kilian and Nisan but they do not provide a proof of it.
Let C0 = {f01 ; : : : ; f0c0} and C1 = {f11 ; : : : ; f1c1} be two function collections realizing
a (k; n)-threshold BSS, with n¿k¿2. Let T0 and T1 be the tables associated to C0
and C1, respectively, and let Rbi , i=1; : : : ; n, denote the ith row of Tb, b∈{0; 1}, i.e.,
Rbi =Tb[{i}] = (fb1 (i); : : : ; fbcb(i)). In this section and in the next one we will think of
the shares assigned to the participants as sets consisting of one or more elements.
Indeed the piece of information distributed by the dealer to each participant may itself
consist of several pieces of information. Let y be a possible share value. We deCne
Rbi ∪y to be the row vector (fb1 (i)∪y; : : : ; fbcb(i)∪y).
Theorem 3.4. Let C0 = {f01 ; : : : ; f0c0} and C1 = {f11 ; : : : ; f1c1} be two function collec-
tions realizing a (k; n)-threshold BSS, with n¿k¿2. There exists at least an index
i∈{1; : : : ; n} such that participant i is given at least n−k+2 distinct values as share.
In other words, at least n− k+2 entries in the ith row of Tb, b∈{0; 1}, are pairwise
distinct.
Proof. The proof is by induction on k. For k =2 the theorem immediately follows
from Theorem 3.2.
Then, let us assume that the theorem holds for k−1¿2 and let us prove that it holds
also for k. Let T0; y (T1; y, resp.) be the table consisting of those columns of T0 (T1,
resp.), having the ith entry equal to the same share y. Let us denote with Xi the subset
of row indices {1; : : : ; n}\{i} and let us consider the collections T0; y[Xi] and T1; y[Xi]
obtained by removing the ith row from T0; y and T1; y, respectively. We replace each
row R of T0; y[Xi] and T1; y[Xi] with R∪y. Let us denote with T ′0; y[Xi] and T ′1; y[Xi] the
two resulting tables. It is immediate to verify that the function collections represented
by T ′0; y[Xi] and T
′
1; y[Xi] realize a (k−1; n−1)-threshold BSS. By induction hypothesis
one has that in such a scheme there is at least a participant who is given at least
(n− 1)− (k − 1) + 2= n− k + 2 distinct values as share. Since distinct shares in the
(k−1; n−1)-threshold BSS correspond to distinct shares in the original (k; n)-threshold
BSS, then the theorem follows.
The following result is a consequence of the above theorem.
Theorem 3.5. Let C0 and C1 be two function collections realizing a (k; n)-threshold
BSS, with n¿k¿2. C0 and C1 have both size larger than or equal to (n− k+2)k−1.
Proof. The proof is by induction on k. For k =2, the lower bound follows from The-
orem 3.4. Then, let us assume that the lower bound holds for k − 1¿2 and let us
prove that it holds also for k. Let C0 = {f01 ; : : : ; f0c0} and C1 = {f11 ; : : : ; f1c1} be two
function collections realizing a (k; n)-threshold BSS. Theorem 3.4 implies that there
exists at least an index i∈{1; : : : ; n} such that participant i is given at least n− k + 2
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distinct values as share. Let sh1i ; : : : ; sh
n−k+2
i denote these shares. Let T0; shui (and T1; shui ,
resp.) denote the table consisting of those columns of T0 (and T1, resp.) having the
ith row equal to the same share value shui , for u=1; : : : ; n − k + 2. Let us denote
with Xi the subset of row indices {1; : : : ; n}\{i} and let T0; shui [Xi] and T1; shui [Xi], be the
two tables obtained by removing the ith row from the tables T0; shui and T1; shui , respec-
tively. Let us replace each row R in the tables T0; shui [Xi] and T1; shui [Xi] with R∪ shui .
Let us denote with T ′0; shui [Xi] and T
′
1; shui
[Xi] the two resulting tables, and with C′0; shui
and C′1; shui the function collections represented by T
′
0; shui
[Xi] and T ′1; shui [Xi], respectively.
The collections C′0; shui and C
′
1; shui
realize a (k − 1; n − 1)-threshold BSS. By induction
hypothesis the sizes of C′0; shui and C
′
1; shui
are both larger than or equal to (n−k+2)k−2.
Then, it is cb= |Cb|=
∑n−k+2
u= 1 |C′b; shui |¿(n− k+2)(n− k+2)k−2 = (n− k+2)k−1, for
b∈{0; 1}.
Theorem 3.5 implies the following lower bound on the minimum randomness of the
(k; n)-threshold BSSs which improves on lower bound (10).
Corollary 3.6. The minimum randomness of the (k; n)-threshold BSSs, n¿k¿2, is
at least (k − 1) log(n− k + 2).
The lower bound of Corollary 3.6 coincides with that of Theorem 2.13 of [13] only
if k = n. Moreover, it is strictly larger than both log
( n−1
k−2
)
+ 1 and log
( n
k−1
)
, for any
n¿k¿2. Indeed, notice that 2
( n−1
k−2
)
=2 n− 1=k − 2 · n− 2=k − 3 · · · · · n− k + 2=1, for
n¿k¿3. Since it is n− j=k− j−1¡n− (j+1)=k− (j+1)−1, for j=1; : : : ; k−3, then
one has 2
( n−1
k−2
)
¡2(n− k + 2)k−26(n− k + 2)k−1, for any n¿k¿3. It is immediate
to verify that 2
( n−1
k−2
)
¡(n − k + 2)k−1 for n¿k =3. Similarly it can be shown that( n
k−1
)
¡(n − k + 2)k−1, for any n¿k¿2. From the above discussion it follows that
the lower bound stated by Corollary 3.6 is always larger than or equal to lower bound
(10).
In [13] it has been proved that the minimum randomness of the (k; n) secret sharing
schemes for a set of h secrets is at least (k−1) log h. Then, one has that the following
theorem holds.
Theorem 3.7. The minimum randomness of the (k; n)-threshold secret sharing
schemes, n¿k¿2, for a set of h secrets is at least (k−1)max{log h; log(n− k+2)}.
3.3. A lower bound on the number of distinct shares in BSSs for general access
structures
Given a strong access structure (Qual; Forb) on a set of participants P , it is re-
latively easy to construct a set G satisfying the hypothesis of Theorem 3.1, while it
might be diEcult to obtain good lower bounds on the number di, i=1; : : : ; n, of shares
assigned to participant i. In the following we will provide a technique to derive such
a lower bound.
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Theorem 3.8. Let C0 = {f00 ; : : : ; f0c0} and C1 = {f10 ; : : : ; f1c1} realize a BSS for the
strong access structure (Qual; Forb) on a set of participants P. Let G be a sub-
set of Forb with the property that for any pair of distinct sets A; B∈G, there
exists a set C ∈Qual such that C =A∪B. For any A∈G, let SA denote the set
of |A|-tuples representing all possible share assignments for the members of A, i.e.
SA= {T [A; j] : j=1; : : : ; cb}, b∈{0; 1}. One has either that |SA|¿|G|, for all A∈G, or
that there exists at least a B∈G such that |SB|¿|G|+ 1. Consequently, there exists
an index i∈P such that the number of all possible share assignments for participant
i is di¿|G|1=|A|, for any A∈G such that i∈A.
Proof. Let G= {A1; : : : ; A|G|}. For any r=1; : : : ; |G|, and any j=1; : : : ; cb, the entries
of the column Tb[Ar; j] represent the shares assigned by fj to the participants in Ar .
For j=1; : : : ; cb, let xbAr ; j =
⋃
i∈Ar f
b
j (i), i.e, x
b
Ar ; j is the set of the shares assigned
by fbj to participants in Ar . For b∈{0; 1}, let T ′b denote the |G|-row table having
(xAr ;1; : : : ; xAr ; cb) as rth row, r=1; : : : ; |G|. The function collections represented by T ′0
and T ′1 realize a (2; |G|)-threshold BSS. Indeed, for any b=0; 1 and j=1; : : : ; cb, one
has that the share xbAr ; j, r=1; : : : ; |G|, provides no information on the secret since it
contains only the shares assigned to the forbidden set of participants Ar , whereas for
any r; q∈{1; : : : ; |G|}, with r = q, it is possible to recover the secret from the shares in
xbAr ; j ∪ xbAq; j since they consist of the shares assigned to participants in Ar ∪Aq which by
hypothesis is a qualiCed group of participants. Theorem 3.3 states that in any (2; |G|)-
threshold BSS, if no participant is assigned more than |G| distinct shares, then all
participants are assigned exactly |G| distinct shares. Hence, it follows that either there
exists an index r ∈{1; : : : ; |G|} such that |SAr |¿|G|+1, or it results |SAr |¿|G|, for any
r=1; : : : ; |G|.
The following example illustrates how Theorems 3.1 and 3.8 can be applied to
derive a lower bound on the minimum randomness of BSSs of any given access
structure.
Example 3.9. Let =(Qual; Forb) be the strong access structure on the set of par-
ticipants {1; 2; 3; 4; 5} with basis 0 = {{1; 2}; {1; 4}; {2; 3}; {2; 4}; {2; 5}; {3; 5}}. We
will prove that the minimum randomness of the BSSs for the access structure  is at
least log 6. Let C0 and C1 be two matrix collections realizing a BSS for the access
structure , and let G= {{1; 3}; {1; 5}; {3; 4}; {4; 5}; {2}}. Notice that G satisCes the
hypothesis of Theorems 3.1 and 3.8. By Theorem 3.8 one has that either |SA|¿5, for
any A∈G, or there exists a set B∈G such that |SB|¿6. In the former case one has
|S{1;3}|¿5 and as a consequence at least one of participants 1 and 3 is assigned more
than two distinct values as share. Since 1 and 3 are both contained in two sets of
G, that is |G1|; |G3|=2, then Theorem 3.1 implies that C0 and C1 have size at least
six. In the latter case, one has |Cb|¿|{T [A; j] : j=1; : : : ; cb}|= |SB|¿6, b∈{0; 1}.
Hence, in both cases C0 and C1 have size at least six and, consequently, the desired
lower bound on the minimum randomness of the BSSs for the access structure  is
proved.
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4. A randomness preserving transformation from BSSs to VCSs
In this section, we will show how to transform a BSS for a strong access structure
 into a VCS for  with the same randomness as the original BSS. First, we introduce
the randomness preserving transformation by means of a simple example.
The initial BSS: Let us consider the strong access structure  on the set of partic-
ipants {1; 2; 3; 4} with basis 0 = {{1; 2; 4}; {1; 3}}. Let us assume that the two tables
T0 and T1 deCning a BSS for  be given as follows:
T0 =
f01 f
0
2 f
0
3 f
0
4
1 x1 x1 y1 y1
2 x2 y2 x2 y2
3 x3 y3 z3 w3
4 x4 y4 y4 x4
; T1 =
f11 f
1
2 f
1
3 f
1
4
1 x1 x1 y1 y1
2 x2 y2 x2 y2
3 z3 w3 x3 y3
4 y4 x4 x4 y4
:
Construction of the matrix collections Cˆ0 and Cˆ1: We associate to each function
fbj , j=1; 2; 3; 4 and b∈{0; 1}, a 4× 4 matrix Mbj . For j=1; 2; 3; 4, and b=0; 1, we
construct the matrix Mbj as follows. For any i=1; 2; 3; 4 and ‘=1; 2; 3; 4, we set the
ith entry of the ‘th column of Mbr equal to
Mbr [i; ‘] =
{
0 if fbr (i) = f
0
‘(i);
1 otherwise:
The matrices resulting from the above construction for our running example are:
M 01 =


0011
0101
0111
0110

 ; M
0
2 =


0011
1010
1011
1001

 ; M
0
3 =


1100
0101
1101
1001

 ; M
0
4 =


1100
1010
1110
0110

 ;
M 11 =


0011
0101
1101
1001

 ; M
1
2 =


0011
1010
1110
0110

 ; M
1
3 =


1100
0101
0111
0110

 ; M
1
4 =


1100
1010
1011
1001

 :
The reader can quickly verify by simple inspection that the matrix collections {M 01 ; M 02 ;
M 03 ; M
0
4 } and {M 11 ; M 12 ; M 13 ; M 14 } yield a VCS for the access structure (Qual; Forb).
The intuition behind the above construction is the following: we start the construction
of the VCS by inserting an all-zero column in each matrix of Cˆ0. Namely, we place an
all-zero column in M 01 as Crst column, in M
0
2 as second column, and so on. It follows
that, for any ‘=1; : : : ; c0, each row of M 0‘ will have the ‘th entry equal to zero. If
for some i=1; : : : ; n, fbr (i)=f
0
‘(i), then the ith row of M
b
r is the same as that of
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Fig. 1. A randomness preserving transformation from a BSS to a VCS.
M 0‘ (i) and consequently, will have the ‘-entry equal to zero as well. The entries in the
matrices of Cˆ0 and Cˆ1 which satisfy this condition are therefore set to zero, whereas
all the remaining entries are set to one.
In the following we provide a general transformation for an arbitrary BSS and present
a formal proof that the resulting matrix collections realize a VCS.
The following properties of Cˆ0 and Cˆ1 capture the general idea which is behind the
randomness preserving transformation of Fig. 1.
Property I. For any j=1; : : : ; cb, ‘=1; : : : ; cb′ , with b; b′ ∈{0; 1}, and for any partic-
ipant i=1; : : : ; n, it results Mbj [{i}] =Mb
′
‘ [{i}] if and only if fbj (i)=fb
′
‘ (i) (i.e., if
and only if Tb[i; j] =Tb′ [i; ‘]).
Proof. Let j∈{1; : : : ; cb} and ‘∈{1; : : : ; cb′}, with b; b′ ∈{0; 1}, and let i∈{1; : : : ; n}.
“if” part: If Mbj [{i}] =Mb
′
‘ [{i}], then there exists an index t ∈{1; : : : ; c0} such that
Mbj [i; t] =Mb
′
‘ [i; t]. Then, exactly one of f
b
j (i) and f
b′
‘ (i) is equal to f
0
t (i), and con-
sequently it results fbj (i) =fb
′
‘ (i).
“only if” part: Let us assume w.l.o.g. that fbj (i)=f
0
r (i), r ∈{1; : : : ; c0}. If fbj (i) =
fb
′
‘ (i), then it results 0=M
b
j [i; r] =Mb
′
‘ [i; r] = 1 and consequently M
b
j [{i}] =
Mb
′
‘ [{i}].
Property II. For ‘=1; : : : ; c0 the ‘th column of M 0‘ is an all-zero column.
Proof. Let ‘∈{1; : : : ; c0}. By construction it is M 0‘ [i; ‘] = 0, for i=1; : : : ; n.
Property III. For any X ∈Qual and j=1; : : : ; c1, M 1j [X ] contains no all-zero column.
Proof. Let X ∈Qual and M 1j ∈ Cˆ1. From Property 1 of DeCnition 2.1 it follows that
for any ‘=1; : : : ; c0, it is {(i; f0‘(i))}i∈X = {(i; f1j (i))}i∈X . Hence, there exists an i‘ ∈
{1; : : : ; n} such that f0‘(i‘) =f1j (i‘). Then, by construction M 1j [i‘; ‘] = 1. It follows that
each column of M 1j [X ] has at least one entry equal to 1.
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Theorem 4.1. Let C0 = {f01 ; : : : ; f0c0} and C1 = {f11 ; : : : ; f1c1} realize a BSS for a
strong access structure  on the set of participants P= {1; : : : ; n}. The transfor-
mation described in Fig. 1 generates a VCS on P for  with pixel expansion equal
to |C0|= c0, contrast equal to one, and having the same randomness as the original
BSS.
Proof. In order to prove that Cˆ0 and Cˆ1 realize a VCS for (Qual; Forb), we need to
prove that Cˆ0 and Cˆ1 satisfy Properties 1 and 2 of DeCnition 2.2.
Proof of Property 1: Let X ∈Qual. For j=1; : : : ; c1, Property III implies that the
“or” V of the rows of M 1j [X ] has Hamming weight w(V )= c0. On the other hand,
Property II implies that, for any ‘=1; : : : ; c0, the ‘th column of M 0‘ is an all-zero
column. Consequently, the “or” U of any subset of rows of M‘ ∈ Cˆ0 has Hamming
weight w(U )6c0 − 1.
Proof of Property 2: Let X = {i1; : : : ; ip}∈Forb. Property 2 of DeCnition 2.1 implies
that the restrictions of T0 and T1 to rows i1; : : : ; ip contain the same columns with the
same relative frequencies, that is the multisets {(T0[i1; j]; : : : ; T0[ip; j])}j∈{1; :::; c0} and
{(T1[i1; j]; : : : ; T1[ip; j])}j∈{1; :::; c1} contain the same p-tuples with the same relative fre-
quencies. Property I implies that for any ‘=1; : : : ; c0 and j=1; : : : ; c1, M 0‘ [X ] =M
1
j [X ]
if and only if (T0[i1; ‘]; : : : ; T0[ip; ‘])= (T1[i1; j]; : : : ; T1[ip; j]). Then it follows that Cˆ0
and Cˆ1 restricted to rows i1; : : : ; ip contain the same matrices with the same relative
frequencies.
In [17] we used the transformation of Fig. 1 to obtain randomness optimal VCSs
for all strong access structures on at most four participants.
4.1. VCSs with perfect reconstruction of black pixels
An interesting property of the VCSs obtained by applying the transformation of
Fig. 1 is that for any X = {i1; i2; : : : ; ip}∈Qual and any M ∈ Cˆ1, the “or” V of rows
i1; i2; : : : ; ip is an all-one vector. As noticed by Verheul and van Tilborg [32], VCSs
with this property generate high-quality images since they allow a perfect reconstruc-
tion of black pixels. See [9,10,32] for bounds on the pixel expansion of such VCSs.
Given a VCS for the strong access structure , we can construct a VCS with per-
fect reconstruction of black pixels for the same access structure as follows. We Crst
construct the distribution function collections C0 and C1 corresponding to the given
VCS, and then we apply the transformation of Fig. 1 to obtain a VCS for  with
perfect reconstruction of black pixels. Hence, one has that the following theorem
holds.
Theorem 4.2. Let Cˆ0 and Cˆ1 be two matrix collections realizing a VCS for the
strong access structure . There exists a VCS for  with perfect reconstruction of
black pixels, having pixel expansion equal to |Cˆ0|, contrast equal to 1, and the same
randomness as the original VCS.
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5. A new upper bound on the randomness of (k; n)-threshold VCSs
In this section, we provide a construction for (k; n)-threshold VCSs which improves
on the randomness of all previously known (k; n)-threshold VCSs and which is very
close to the lower bound of Corollary 3.6. The idea of the construction consists of ap-
plying Theorem 4.1 to Shamir’s (k; n)-threshold secret sharing scheme [28]. Shamir’s
scheme shares a secret s, uniformly chosen in GF(2r), among a set of n¡2r par-
ticipants. We recall that in Shamir’s secret sharing scheme the distribution function
collection associated to a secret s∈GF(2r) is
Cs= {p(x)= s+ a1x + a2x2 + · · ·+ ak−1xk−1 : aj ∈GF(2r); j=1; : : : ; k − 1}:
The randomness of the scheme is equal to (k − 1)r since the dealer needs (k − 1)r
random bits to choose the coeEcients a1; a2; : : : ; ak−1.
Given Shamir’s secret sharing scheme to share a secret s∈GF(2r) among the set of
participants P= {1; : : : ; n}, with n¡2r , we can construct a BSS  for P as follows.
We assume w.l.o.g. that the binary secret be chosen in {0; 1}. To share a secret bit
b∈{0; 1}, the dealer uniformly chooses a polynomial p(x) in
Cb= {p(x)= b+ a1x + a2x2 + · · ·+ ak−1xk−1 : aj ∈GF(2r); j=1; : : : ; k − 1}
and for i=1; : : : ; n, distributes to participant i the share p(i). By applying the ran-
domness preserving transformation of Fig. 1 to  we obtain a VCS with randomness
(k − 1)r. Since it must be 2r¿n, then r can be as small as log(n+ 1). Hence, the
following theorem holds.
Theorem 5.1. There exists a (k; n)-threshold VCS, 26k6n, with pixel expansion
2(k−1)log(n+1), contrast 1, and randomness (k − 1)log(n+ 1).
Table 1 summarizes some known upper bounds on the randomness of (k; n)-threshold
VCSs. Notice that the bound of Theorem 5.1 greatly improves on all other bounds.
Indeed, all other bounds, except that of Corollary 2 of [16] which holds only for
constant values of the threshold k, are exponential in k. Moreover, the upper bound of
Theorem 5.1 is very close to the lower bound of Corollary 3.6.
5.1. Randomness optimal (k; k)-threshold VCSs
In this section, we show how to obtain a (k; k)-threshold VCS whose randomness is
as small as possible. To this aim we use the well known construction for randomness
optimal (k; k)-threshold BSSs (see for example [30]). The randomness of this BSS is
k − 1. Hence, by applying the randomness preserving transformation to this BSS one
has that the following theorem holds.
Theorem 5.2. For any k¿2, there exists a (k; k)-threshold VCS with pixel expansion
2k−1, contrast 1 and randomness k − 1.
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Table 1
Upper bounds on the randomness of (k; n)-threshold VCSs
Naor et al. [26] nk log(2k−1!)
Ateniese et al. [1] log((O(k(2e)k) log n)!)
Theorem 6 [16]
( n
k−1
) − 1
Theorem 9 [16] (k − 1)( nk )
Corollary 1 [16] O(k2ek) log n
Corollary 2 [16] O(k2 log
∗ n log n),
for k constant
Theorem 5.1 (k − 1)log(n+ 1)
It is interesting to notice that the randomness optimal (k; k)-threshold VCS obtained
by using our randomness preserving transformation [18,19] is also obtainable by using
the construction for randomness optimal (k; k)-threshold VCSs provided in [16]. We
recall that in [16] it has been proved that any (k; k)-threshold VCS has pixel expansion
larger than or equal to 2k−1 and that our (k; k)-threshold VCS is the only randomness
optimal (k; k)-threshold VCS with pixel expansion 2k−1.
6. VCS constructions for general access structures
In this section, we provide constructions of visual cryptography schemes for gen-
eral access structures based on well known construction techniques for secret sharing
schemes.
6.1. A construction for access structures whose basis is a complete multipartite
graph
Let =(Qual; Forb) be a strong access structure on a set of participants P. If the
basis 0 consists of groups of two participants, then it can be represented by a graph
G=(V; E) with V =P and E= {(p1; p2) : {p1; p2}∈Qual}. Suppose that 0 can be
represented by a complete multipartite graph, that is a graph whose vertex set can be
partitioned into ‘ parts V1; : : : ; V‘, such that two vertices u and v are connected by an
edge if and only if u∈Vi and v∈Vj for i = j.
It is possible to obtain a BSS for the above access structure by resorting to the
Brickell construction introduced in [14]. That construction allows to obtain secret shar-
ing schemes for general access structures with special properties. In particular, for the
above access structure , this technique yields a BSS realized by function collections
of size ‘.
Theorem 3.1 implies that this BSS is randomness optimal. By applying the random-
ness preserving transformation of Fig. 1 to this BSS, we obtain a randomness optimal
VCS for . Hence, one has that the following theorems hold.
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Theorem 6.1. Let =(Qual; Forb) be a strong access structure on a set of partic-
ipants P. If the basis 0 can be represented by a complete multipartite graph with
‘ parts, then there exists a VCS with randomness log ‘.
Theorem 6.2. For every n¿2, there exists a (2; n)-threshold VCS with optimal ran-
domness log n.
6.2. Obtaining VCSs from smaller BSSs
Let (Qual; Forb) be a strong access structure on the set of participants P. Let
P′ and P′′ be two sets of participants such that P′ ∪P′′=P, and let (′Qual; ′Forb)
and (′′Qual; 
′′
Forb) be two strong access structures on P
′ and P′′, respectively, such
that Qual=′Qual ∪′′Qual and Forb=′Forb ∩′′Forb. In this section, we illustrate a new
technique to construct a VCS for an access structure (Qual; Forb) using the BSSs for
the access structures (′Qual; 
′
Forb) and (
′′
Qual; 
′′
Forb).
In [1,16] it has been presented analogous techniques to obtain a VCS for a given
access structure by “composing” VCSs for smaller access structures. We point out
that the techniques in [1,16] do not apply to all VCSs. Indeed, the technique in [1]
applies only to strong VCSs deCned by basis matrices, whereas the one in [16] ap-
plies to VCSs fulClling a special condition on the shares associated with the for-
bidden sets. The construction described in this section allows to construct a VCS
for (Qual; Forb)= (′Qual ∪′′Qual; ′Forb ∩′′Forb), using any two BSSs for the structures
(′Qual; 
′
Forb) and (
′′
Qual; 
′′
Forb).
The construction technique illustrated in this section is a generalization of an analo-
gous technique presented in [15]. Several similar techniques, all known with the name
of decomposition technique, have been described in [11,15,24,25].
The construction of a BSS  for the access structure (Qual; Forb) works as follows.
Let ′ and ′′ be two BSSs for the access structures (′Qual; 
′
Forb) and (
′′
Qual; 
′′
Forb),
respectively. Let C′0 and C
′
1 be the function collections associated with 
′, and let C′0
and C′′1 be the function collections associated with 
′′. Given any two shares x1 and
x2, we denote with x1 ◦ x2 the share obtained by concatenating x1 and x2. Let y′ and
y′′ be two shares arbitrarily chosen in ′ and ′′, respectively. In order to share a
secret b∈{0; 1}, the dealer of  randomly chooses a distribution function f′ in C′b
and a distribution function f′′ in C′b. The dealer assigns to each P ∈P′ ∩P′′ the share
f′(P) ◦f′′(P), to each P ∈P′\P′′ the share f′(P) ◦y′′, and to each P ∈P′′\P′ the
share y′ ◦f′′(P).
More formally, the distribution functions of the resulting BSS  are deCned as
follows. For b=0; 1, let f′ and f′′ be two distribution functions belonging to C′b and
C′′b , respectively. We denote with [f
′ ◦f′′] the distribution function which assigns to
each participant P ∈P the share
[f′ ◦ f′′](P) =


f′(P) ◦ f′′(P) if P ∈ P′ ∩P′′;
f′(P) ◦ y′′ if P ∈ P′\P′′;
y′ ◦ f′′(P) if P ∈ P′′\P′:
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For b=0; 1, we denote with C′b ◦C′′b the function collection {[f′ ◦f′′] :f′ ∈C′b and
f′′ ∈C′′b }. It is easy to see that the two function collections C′0 ◦C′′0 and C′1 ◦C′′1 realize
a BSS for .
By applying the randomness preserving transformation of Fig. 1 to , we obtain a
VCS for the strong access structure (′Qual ∪′′Qual; ′Forb ∩′′Forb). Hence the following
theorem holds.
Theorem 6.3. Let (′Qual; 
′
Forb) and (
′′
Qual; 
′′
Forb) be two strong access structures on
the sets of participants P′ and P′′, respectively. Let the function collections C′0 and
C′1 realize a BSS for (
′
Qual; 
′
Forb), and let the function collections C
′′
0 and C
′′
1 realize
a BSS for (′′Qual; 
′′
Forb). Then, there exists a VCS for the strong access structure
(′Qual ∪′′Qual; ′Forb ∩′′Forb) realized by two function collections of size |C′0| · |C′′0 |
and |C′1| · |C′′1 |, respectively.
Notice that, given any VCSs for (′Qual; 
′
Forb) and (
′′
Qual; 
′′
Forb), we can easily
construct the function collections realizing the BSSs for the two access structures and
apply the above technique to obtain a VCS for (′Qual ∪′′Qual; ′Forb ∩′′Forb).
6.3. A construction using cumulative arrays
In this section, we present a construction of VCSs based on the cumulative array
technique introduced by Simmons et al. [29]. Such technique allows to obtain a BSS for
any given access structure starting from a (d; d)-threshold BSS, where d is a parameter
depending on the access structure. The function collections of the resulting BSS have
the same size as those of the (d; d)-threshold BSS. The cumulative array technique has
been employed for the Crst time in the VCS construction in [16] where it has been
applied directly to a (d; d)-threshold VCS. Both the technique presented in this paper
and that in [16] lead to the same VCSs.
Let =(Qual; Forb) be a strong access structure on a set of participants
P= {1; : : : ; n}, and let MFS denote the collection of the maximal forbidden sets
of :
MFS = {B ∈ Forb : B ∪ {i} ∈ Qual : for all i ∈ P\B}:
The size of MFS is the parameter d used in the construction. If we apply the
cumulative array technique to the (d; d)-threshold BSS of Section 5.1 then we obtain
two function collections of size 2d−1 realizing a BSS for the strong access structure
(Qual; Forb). We can apply our randomness preserving transformation to such BSS to
obtain a (Qual; Forb)-VCS. Hence, the following theorem holds.
Theorem 6.4. Let =(Qual; Forb) be a strong access structure, and let MFS be the
family of the maximal forbidden sets in Forb. Then, there exists a (Qual; Forb)-VCS
with pixel expansion m=2|MFS|−1 and randomness |MFS| − 1.
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